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Abstract 
The cyclical behaviors of government spending and output are investigated for the 
time period 1996-2013, in the sample of 45 countries divided between 3 groups of 
countries – Western European, Eastern European and CIS countries – with each one 
of these groups representing a different development stage. Panel data fixed effects 
model was used for estimation purposes. In developed countries the main 
determinant of government spending effectiveness is found to be institutional quality, 
but access to financial markets is more pronounced in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal and monetary policies together comprise the two main tools used by 
governments to stabilize economic activity. Economic policy is more effective when 
these two are used simultaneously in the same direction. But the options for 
monetary policy to impact the economic activity becomes limited when either there 
is a fixed exchange rate regime or a country chooses to abandon the opportunity of 
manipulating national currency by joining a monetary union or the interest rates hit 
the zero lower bound. Thus, governments mainly turn to fiscal policy to intervene in 
economic process.  
The response of fiscal policy to fluctuations in output can be automatic or 
discretionary. Automatic fiscal stabilizers include such policy variables as taxes and 
social transfers. These are called automatic, because they are predetermined and 
automatically adjust to economic stance, i.e. during upturns, tax revenues rise and 
social transfers fall, but during downturns the opposite occurs. In short, automatic 
stabilizers induce countercyclical fiscal policy – government expenditure rises when 
GDP growth falls and falls when GDP growth rises. Saving in good times and 
spending in bad times reduces volatility in economic activity and lower volatility is 
associated with higher growth rates (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995). So countercyclical fiscal policy stipulates high economic growth.  
On the other hand, discretionary fiscal policy is when fiscal policy is implemented 
not according to some predetermined rules, but to the discretion of policymakers. 
Discretionary fiscal policies are considered to be the main source of destabilizing 
effect of fiscal policy and the more discretionary the fiscal policy is, the more it tends 
to be procyclical3. Procyclicality induces high output volatility and undermines 
economic growth. In this sense, automatic stabilizers are superior to discretionary 
policy actions. The main advantages of automatic stabilizers include the absence of 
lag between policy formulation and implementation, as well as the reduction of 
human factor in policymaking process. 
                                                             
3Procyclicality – government spending rises and falls in the same direction with GDP growth; the opposite of 
countercyclicality. 
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In this paper the cyclicality of public spending has been adopted as a proxy for 
government spending effectiveness in general, meaning that when fiscal policy is 
countercyclical, it can be considered as effective. We draw attention to the quality of 
institutions as a determinant of fiscal policy cyclicality, following Acemoglu et al. 
(2002), who claim that macroeconomic policy distortions are not the cause of the 
volatility in economic growth, as frequently stated, but rather they are a symptom of 
institutional problems. 
In fact, the recognition of the quality of institutions as one of the major driving forces 
of economic growth dates back to the works by North and Thomas (1973) and North 
(1990). Since then a number of empirical investigations have been carried to find out 
the impact of institutions on economic growth and the channels by which this impact 
feeds through to economy. Some examples include Knack and Keefer (1995), Perotti 
(1996) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). This paper contributes to the strand of literature 
exploring the impacts of institutional quality on the cyclicality of government 
spending. Here we emphasize the following impact mechanism: low institutional 
quality undermines effectiveness of government expenditures by making them more 
procyclical (and thus, volatile) and hinders economic growth. Based on the 
classification of institutions by Acemoglu, we look at the impacts of economic and 
political institutions on cyclicality separately.  Also the question whether the access 
to international financial markets and financial depth of a country matters for the 
cyclical patterns is addressed in this paper. 
45 countries divided into 3 different groups are analyzed separately for the time 
period 1996 – 2013, for each country group to represent a different development 
stage. The results of the empirical work show that in advanced economies quality of 
institutions is the main factor affecting cyclicality, while in emerging and developing 
countries it is financial openness that matters the most.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature, 
Section 3 explains the methodology and data employed, while Section 4 reports the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
Considering the points discussed in the previous section, it is not surprising that 
automatic fiscal stabilizers dominate the fiscal policy in highly developed countries 
while in developing countries discretionary fiscal policy is more widespread. A study 
by IMF covering data on 85 advanced, emerging market and developing economies 
shows that overall fiscal policy is much more stabilizing in advanced economies 
compared to emerging market and developing countries4. Automatic stabilizers 
“account for more than one-half of overall fiscal stabilization in about 60 percent of 
the advanced economies in the sample. In the emerging market and developing 
economies, automatic stabilizers account for only about 30% of total fiscal 
stabilization.” (IMF, April 2015, p.26). This suggests that in developing countries 
fiscal policy is more procyclical compared to highly developed countries. 
Theoretically this phenomenon cannot be fully explained. 
Keynesian theory emphasizes the role of automatic stabilizers and claims that fiscal 
policy should smooth the business cycle by affecting demand through taxes, 
government spending and social transfers, i.e. should be countercyclical to reduce the 
volatility in economic activity. Neoclassical economic theory, on the other hand, 
takes expenditure side of the fiscal policy as exogenous and focuses mainly on the 
revenue side. Tax smoothing hypothesis of Barro (1979) states that tax rates should 
stay constant given that the shocks to tax base are temporary, so there will be a 
positive correlation between output and tax revenues, which is consistent with the 
countercyclicality of fiscal balance (Halland and Bleaney, 2009). 
Despite lacking theoretical explanations, there exists plenty of empirical evidence 
confirming the procyclicality of fiscal policy, especially in developing countries, 
while in advanced economies it tends to be countercyclical, or at least acyclical 
(Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Alesina et 
                                                             
4 The measure of fiscal stabilization used here is stabilization coefficient, which equals to average change in overall 
fiscal balance in percent of GDP associated with a 1 percentage point change in output. See: IMF World Economic and 
Financial Surveys. (April 2015). Chapter 2. Can fiscal policy stabilize output? In: Fiscal Monitor – Now is the time: 
Fiscal policies for sustainable growth. IMF Publications: Washington, D.C. 
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al., 2008). Empirical work finding prove for procyclical fiscal policy in advanced 
economies is not uncommon either (Arreaza et al., 1998; Lane, 2003) 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) were among the first to present evidence of procyclical 
government spending in Latin American countries and this is explained as a result of 
the voracity effects related to political distortions and also the loss of market access 
during macroeconomic downturns. Gavin and Perotti were not the only ones to 
explore fiscal procyclicality in Latin American countries. In fact, a significant part of 
the literature related to the topic focuses on this region. 
Frankel (2011) explores the case of Chile, who was able to transform its fiscal policy 
from being procyclical to countercyclical during the last two decades. The author 
gives the main credit for this transition to the improvement in the quality of fiscal 
institutions in the form of newly established fiscal rules employed to keep the 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance at target. 
On the other hand, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) take the case of other two 
Latin American countries – namely Argentina and Brazil and compare their public 
debt and budget deficit levels in late 1990’s to that of Italy in early 1980’s (high 
public deficit periods). The comparison shows that both the level of debt and deficit 
in Italy was significantly larger than in Argentina and Brazil, but unlike in these 
Latin American countries, in Italy the deficit was countercyclical. The authors go 
further and show that this is not only true for the countries under study, but also for 
the whole group of developing and advanced economies: in developing countries 
budget deficit tends to be procyclical, while in advanced economies it is rather 
countercyclical. The main reason for this is claimed to be the level of financial depth 
of a country, as the financial system of the country is underdeveloped, government 
cannot find any other resource for repaying debts other than increasing taxes. Also 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) state that more public investment crowds out 
private investment and that’s why expansionary fiscal policies in fact have 
contractionary effects. But the authors feel the need to also mention the effect of 
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political distortions namely in Argentina, saying that the inability of political leaders 
to react to the crisis on time further worsened the situation.  
Unlike Caballero and Krishnamurthy, Albuquerque (2012) focuses on advanced EU 
countries. He finds out significant negative relationship between volatility of 
discretionary fiscal policy and the quality of fiscal institutions and explains the 
results as more checks and balances limit the ability of policymakers to use fiscal 
policy frequently, lowering the fluctuations in spending. But political institutions 
seem to play an insignificant role in the public spending volatility. 
On the contrary, Alesina et al. (2008) explain the problem of procyclicality as a result 
of political agency problem in corrupt democracies, where voters follow “starve the 
beast” strategy. Aware of the rent-seeking behavior of government officials, voters 
demand the resources received during economic upturns to be spent immediately in 
the form of increased government spending or reduced taxes. Because they know that 
if these resources are not spent, they will be wasted in the form of rents. The 
proposition that the underdevelopment of domestic financial markets and lack of 
access to international financial markets is the reason for procyclicality is criticized 
by Alesina et al. (2008), on the grounds that, this does not explain why governments, 
aware that the financial depth and openness is limited in their country, do not 
accumulate reserves in good times to be used during recessions. 
Our main paper of interest here is Frankel et al. (2013), who present evidence that 
many developing countries were able to “graduate from fiscal procyclicality and 
become countercyclical” and points out to the increase in the quality of fiscal 
institutions in the form of fiscal rules as the main driving force behind this. Such 
factors as financial depth, openness, integration, the level of government debt and 
foreign reserves are also found to have statistically significant effect on fiscal 
cyclicality. 
But the adoption of fiscal rules does not always lead to less procyclicality. A recent 
work by Bova, Carcenac and Guerguil (2014) provide evidence that in developing 
countries the adoption of fiscal rules has increased rapidly especially during the last 
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two decades, but unlike in advanced economies, this has not caused more 
countercyclical fiscal policies in these countries. It is suggested that higher quality 
institutional arrangements and more flexible fiscal rules are required to reduce 
procyclicality and the main issue is not de-jure existence of certain rules, but rather 
de-facto level of compliance with the rules, which is hard to measure. 
To sum up, authors investigating the causes of procyclical fiscal policy find two main 
reasons for it: 
1) The quality of fiscal and political institutions – In the presence of low quality 
institutions governments cannot resist the pressure of spending much during booms. 
Besides political pressures, the absence of fixed fiscal rules and other fiscal 
constraints allows policymakers to freely manipulate government spending. 
2) Financial constraints – The constraints to the access of governments to credit via 
domestic and international financial markets make it difficult for them to acquire 
resources during recessions, so the governments have no other mean of raising 
revenue other than cutting spending. 
Of course, the results obtained from empirical work are very sensitive to the 
methodology and data employed, also to the chosen country groups and time periods. 
3. Methodology and data 
To empirically assess the cyclicality of government spending and its determinants, 
we make use of unbalanced panel data set.  We focus on 3 groups of countries 
separately: 12 post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 15 East 
European and 18 West European countries for the annual time period 1996 – 2013 
(for the list of countries included for each country group, see Appendix, A1). As it 
can be seen, the country groups can be matched with 3 different stages of 
development: CIS countries are at earlier stage of development yet, while East 
European countries have already achieved a moderate level of development; West 
European countries represent countries with high and sustainable economic 
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development. In dividing the countries between such groups the purpose is to find 
out whether determinants of the effectiveness of government spending differ among 
countries in different development stages.  
To empirically assess the relationship of interest to us fixed effects model is used. 
Methodology is derived from Frankel et al. (2013) with the estimating equation: 
(3.1) gitc = α0 + α1  log(yit)c + α2  IQit + α3  FinAccessit + α4 [log(yit)c * IQit] + α5  
[log(yit)c * FinAccessit] + τt Tt + ui + εit 
where gitc and yitc illustrate the cyclical components of government expenditure and 
output respectively, IQit is the measure of institutional quality, FinAccessit catches the 
effect of access to financing, Tt here illustrates year dummies included in the 
regression to account for unobservable time-specific effects, ui is country specific 
fixed effects – if there are any, and finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Our primary interest here is on the interaction terms. The interaction terms show the 
marginal change in the cyclicality of government spending (the relationship between 
cyclical components of output and government spending) associated with a unit 
change in institutional quality or financial access. For example, a negative coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term [log(yit)c * IQit ] shows that an increase in the 
institutional quality is associated with a less procyclical government spending and its 
magnitude reflects the decrease in the marginal change in government spending 
associated with a 1% increase in output, when the institutional quality increases by 
one unit, holding all other variables constant.  Similarly, a negative coefficient 
estimate for the term [log(yit)c * FinAccessit ] illustrates that an increase in financial 
access is associated with a more countercyclical (or less procyclical) government 
spending and the magnitude of the coefficient estimate shows the decline in the 
marginal change in budget expenditures associated with a 1% rise in output, when 
access to financial markets increases by one unit, controlling for all other variables. 
So coefficient estimates on interaction terms need to be negative and significant to 
prove that an increase in institutional quality and the access of government to 
financial markets decrease procyclicality. 
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To estimate the effect of institutional quality on cyclicality, we look at both the 
quality of economic and political institutions separately. Access to financing is also 
differentiated between access to foreign and domestic financing. 
Government expenditure data is proxied by general government total expenditure in 
national currency (constant prices).  
The proxy for output is a rather standard one – annual GDP in constant national 
currency. Both output and government expenditure data are acquired from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook Database. 
After taking natural logarithms, Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100, as default for yearly 
data) is used to obtain cyclical components of government spending and output, 
following Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Frankel et al. (2013). 
To obtain a measure of the quality of economic institutions we take 6 variables from 
WB Worldwide Governance Indicators, namely Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, each of which are estimated in [-2.5; 2.5] 
interval and calculate simple averages to get a single index for the quality of 
institutions.  
The quality of political institutions is proxied by polity2 variable from Polity IV 
index which measures the extent of democracy versus autocracy on a [-10; 10] scale, 
with lower index indicating less democracy and more autocracy (see Appendix, A3). 
We make use of Chinn-Ito financial openness index to measure the access to foreign 
financial markets which is also used by Frankel et al. (2013). To proxy financial 
depth private credit over GDP is used, a measure which has been employed by 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004). Data on domestic credit to private sector as 
percent of GDP5 is acquired from the World Bank’s WDI. 
Incorporating all the discussed variables, we get our main estimating equation: 
                                                             
5 Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by banks and other 
financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivables that establish a claim for repayment. 
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(3.2) TotalExp_Cycle = β0 + β1  LogGDP_Cycle + β2  WGI_average+ β3 Polity+ β4  
FinOpen + β5 PrivCredit+ β6 [LogGDP_Cycle # WGI_average] + β7  
[LogGDP_Cycle # Polity] + β8  [LogGDP_Cycle # FinOpen] + β9  
[LogGDP_Cycle # PrivCredit] + τt Tt + ui + εit 
All indexes are standardized to facilitate interpretation. Winsorization at 0.5% level 
is applied to all variables to smooth the data and reduce the effect of outliers if there 
are any. Full set of year dummies are incorporated into the estimation model. 
Replication of graphs presented by Frankel et al. (2013) for our sample of 45 
countries for the period 1996-2013 (Appendix, Figure A1, A2) confirms our first 
predictions about the countercyclicality of government expenditures mainly in 
developed countries and procyclicality in developing ones.  
Looking at the scatter plot of the relationship between the quality of economic 
institutions and government spending effectiveness, one can spot an inverted-U 
shaped relationship (Figure 1.a) which means in the first stages of development, 
when the quality of institutions is low, an increase in the quality leads to an increase 
in procyclicality, i.e. reduces efficiency. But when the quality of institutions is high 
enough, further increase in the quality reduces procyclicality, thus increases 
efficiency. Financial openness and financial depth indicators exhibit slightly 
noticeable downward slopes, only moderately explaining differences in countries’ 
procyclicality levels (Figure 1. c, d). On the other hand, the quality of political 
institutions seems to be irrelevant factor of government spending effectiveness. 
Figure 1. Correlation between cyclical components of government spending and 
output vs. explanatory variables. 
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Note: Cyclical components are calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100). Correlation between cyclical 
components of government expenditure and output is their correlation coefficient. Negative correlation shows 
countercyclicality of government spending and positive correlation shows procyclicality.  
4. Empirical results 
As our time period is relatively short (18 years), there is no need to test for unit roots 
and autocorrelation. Panel data fixed effects model is employed for estimation. 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effects model shows the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in all 3 groups, so we calculate robust standard errors 
to account both for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Table 1 presents the empirical results.  For Western European countries quality of 
economic institutions is the only significant determinant of government spending 
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effectiveness.  For these countries 1 standard deviation6 increase in the quality of 
institutions is associated with 0.76 per cent decrease in procyclicality, thus increases 
effectiveness. The cyclical components of output (LogGDP_Cycle) has negative 
coefficient estimate as expected, showing that the government spending is 
countercyclical, though not significant. 
Quality of economic institutions appears to be significant determinant of cyclicality 
for Eastern European countries too. The magnitude of the effect is larger compared to 
high-income country group: 1 standard deviation increase in the quality of economic 
institutions leads to 1.4 percent decrease in procyclicality (or increase in 
countercyclicality). Negative coefficient estimate for LogGDP_Cycle implies 
countercyclicality of government spending, but again not significant. 
Another variable of interest for Eastern European country group is the effect of 
financial openness on cyclicality. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is 
strongly significant, but interestingly with positive sign, not quite what we expected. 
This means that an increase in financial openness reduces government expenditure 
effectiveness: 1 standard deviation increase in financial openness is associated with 
1.17% more procyclical government spending. Increasing financial depth also 
appears to increase procyclicality, though weakly significant (at 10% confidence 
level). 
For CIS countries none of the included variables show significance in explaining the 
relationship of interest. Though insignificant, coefficient estimate of LogGDP_Cycle 
is positive confirming our expectations of procyclical government spending in 
developing countries. The reason for the incapability of our model to find significant 
determinants of government spending effectiveness for these countries is not merely 
related to the variable choice. More likely it is the result of the low quality of 
available data for these countries. 
                                                             
6 All indeces are standardized  and the coefficient estimates show the changes in output variable caused by a 1 standard 
deviation change in input variables. 
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Quality of political institutions fail to significantly explain the differences in 
cyclicality levels of government spending in all country groups. We suspect that the 
reason for this is the lack of variability in the quality of political institutions over the 
years within each country: countries mainly sustained specific to them levels of 
polity4 scores with occasional changes and as fixed effects estimation mainly focuses 
on within group variation, the effect of the political institutions on cyclicality cannot 
be captured. 
  Table 1. Panel regression results 
Dependent variable Cyclical components of general government total 
expenditure 
 Western Europe Eastern Europe CIS 
    
LogGDP_Cycle -0.697 -2.411 2.759 
 (5.225) (2.120) (1.907) 
WGI_average -0.0242 0.0197 0.107** 
 (0.0417) (0.0547) (0.0374) 
Polity -0.0238 -0.0301 0.0420 
 (0.0181) (0.0276) (0.0560) 
FinOpen 0.00559 0.0181 -0.100 
 (0.0371) (0.0205) (0.0717) 
PrivCredit 0.000342 0.00135*** -0.00173 
 (0.000207) (0.000379) (0.00223) 
LogGDP_Cycle # WGI_average -0.759*** -1.420** 1.292 
 (0.104) (0.512) (2.003) 
LogGDP_Cycle # Polity 0.985 0.890 0.881 
 (2.232) (1.354) (0.864) 
LogGDP_Cycle # FinOpen 0.593 1.171*** -1.112 
 (2.404) (0.356) (0.740) 
LogGDP_Cycle # PrivCredit -0.000348 0.0164* -0.0571 
 (0.00252) (0.00860) (0.0417) 
Constant 0.0631 -0.0848*** -0.319 
 (0.0558) (0.0215) (0.384) 
Observations 219 170 140 
R-squared 0.520 0.652 0.236 
Number of country 16 12 11 
 
Note: Cyclical components are calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100). Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate relative significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Robustness check 
For robustness purposes we employ another indicator, namely public consumption 
expenditure, to proxy for our dependent variable. Government consumption 
expenditure has been used as a measure of government spending by Alesina et al. 
(2008), Woo (2009) and Halland and Bleaney (2009). Data on general government 
final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) is acquired from World Bank World 
Development Indicators. General government final consumption expenditure is a 
category of government spending that only includes the acquisition of goods and 
services by government to satisfy current individual and collective needs of society 
and does not include government investment expenditures and social transfers. The 
exclusion of social transfers from government spending provides us with a measure 
of spending free from the effect of automatic stabilizers. 
The output is proxied by natural logarithm of annual GDP (constant 2005 US$). HP 
filter (λ=100) is again used to obtain cyclical components of output and government 
spending. 
On the other hand, we replace our index of economic institutions quality with another 
index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, as is done by Knack 
and Keefer (1995) and Frankel et al. (2013). The weighted average of 4 variables 
from ICRG, namely Law and order, Bureaucracy quality, Corruption and Investment 
profile is calculated to acquire single index showing institutional quality (see 
Appendix, A2). The index then is standardized to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation. 
Panel data fixed effects model with robust standard errors is estimated with full set of 
year dummies included. Table 2 illustrates the results. 
Again for Western European countries the quality of economic institutions appears to 
be significant determinant of the cyclicality of government spending with expected 
negative sign, meaning that an increase in the quality of economic institutions 
reduces government spending procyclicality or increases countercyclicality, 
enhancing effectiveness of government spending. But for Eastern European countries 
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quality of economic institutions loses significance, though keeping sign. Financial 
openness index is weakly significant and changes sign from being positive to 
negative, meaning that an increase in financial openness increases countercyclicality 
of spending. While for CIS countries, financial openness significantly affects 
government spending effectiveness and an increase in financial openness is 
associated with a decrease in procyclicality (or increase in countercyclicality). 
  Table 2. Robustness results 
Dependent variable Cyclical components of general government final 
consumption expenditure 
 Western Europe Eastern Europe CIS 
    
LgGDP_Cycle 28.05 -21.61 3.005 
 (28.78) (15.23) (4.979) 
ICRG_average -0.286* -0.378 -0.303 
 (0.150) (0.453) (0.833) 
Polity 0.761 -0.986*** 5.128 
 (0.504) (0.307) (3.307) 
FinOpen -0.197 0.210 -0.392 
 (0.235) (0.128) (1.574) 
PrivCredit 0.00307 -0.000708 -0.0182 
 (0.00178) (0.00750) (0.0219) 
LgGDP_Cycle # ICRG_average -7.200** -8.451 9.541 
 (2.935) (5.445) (8.235) 
LgGDP_Cycle # Polity 0.903 21.58 6.510 
 (18.66) (12.35) (5.396) 
LgGDP_Cycle # FinOpen -18.51 -6.305* -8.058** 
 (21.62) (2.993) (2.209) 
LgGDP_Cycle # PrivCredit 0.0399 0.00506 -0.315 
 (0.0482) (0.0944) (0.181) 
Constant -0.411 1.953*** 1.156 
 (0.910) (0.471) (0.614) 
    
Observations 197 136 86 
R-squared 0.635 0.506 0.369 
Number of country 16 11 7 
 
Note: Cyclical components are calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100). Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate relative significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Conclusion 
To summarize the main conclusions from the research, the main determinants of 
fiscal spending effectiveness differ among country groups: going from high to low 
developed countries the significance of the determinants shifts from institutional 
factors to financial factors. The quality of economic institutions is strongly 
significant determinant of government spending effectiveness for high-income 
Western European countries and is robust to different specifications. For these 
countries an increase in economic institutions quality index increases 
countercyclicality of government spending. Financial openness is significant factor 
affecting fiscal cyclicality in Eastern European countries, but its effects are not clear-
cut. Failure of obtaining robust results for Eastern European and CIS countries is 
likely to be the consequence of low data quality for these countries. 
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APPENDIX 
A1. The list of the countries included in empirical analysis 
Western European  
countries 
Eastern European  
countries 
CIS countries 
 
Austria Albania Armenia 
Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Azerbaijan 
Denmark Croatia Belarus 
Finland Czech Republic Georgia* 
France Estonia Kazakhstan 
Germany Hungary Kyrgyz Republic 
Greece Kosovo Moldova 
Iceland Latvia Russian Federation 
Ireland Lithuania Tajikistan 
Italy Macedonia, FYR Turkmenistan 
Luxembourg Poland Ukraine 
Netherlands Romania Uzbekistan 
Norway Serbia 
 
Portugal Slovak Republic 
 
Spain Slovenia 
 
Sweden 
  
Switzerland 
  
United Kingdom 
  
*Despite the fact that Georgia is not now the member of CIS, we include it in the model, mainly because we are more 
interested in the development level of countries and the division of countries between country groups here is 
conventional, secondly our analysis covers the time period 1996 – 2013 and Georgia left the organization in 2009, so 
during most of this period it was a member of CIS. 
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A2. Quality of economic institutions – International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) dataset 
ICRG is a source of country risk analysis and is produced by Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group monthly since 1980 for 140 countries. It assesses such elements as 
political conditions, currency risks, investment environment, corruption and many 
other risk factors and quantifies them in 22 variables. This paper employs 4 of these 
variables to measure the quality of economic institutions in a country: 
1) Corruption variable assesses corruption within the political system and is 
measured on a 6 point scale. 
2) Law and Order comprises of two subcomponents. Law subcomponent 
measures strength and impartiality of the legal system on a 3 point scale and 
Order subcomponent assesses popular observance of the law on a 3 point 
scale. The values for subcomponents are then added to get a single indicator on 
a 6 point scale. 
3) Investment Profile measures the risks to investment existing by a reason other 
than political, economic or financial and comprises of 3 subcomponents: 
Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation and Payment Delays, 
each of which varies between 0 and 4. These subcomponents are then summed 
to get a measure of risk rating on 12 point scale. 
4) Bureaucracy quality is assessed on a 4 point scale and strong bureaucracies are 
given higher scores due to the fact that these bureaucracies are independent of 
political pressures and have established operating mechanisms. 
To change monthly data to annual we calculate simple averages. Our measure of 
economic institutions quality is calculated as the weighted average of these 4 annual 
variables and then standardized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
 A3. Quality of political institutions – Polity IV dataset 
Polity IV dataset assesses qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions. It is produced by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) and 
contains annual data for the period 1800-2013. Polity IV project analysis various 
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authority characteristics of countries such as institutionalized democracy and 
autocracy, executive recruitment process, restrictions on executives authority and 
transitions of political regimes. This paper employs polity2 (revised combined polity 
score) variable from this dataset to proxy political institutions quality. Polity2 is the 
difference between other 2 variables – democ (institutionalized democracy) and 
autoc (institutionalized autocracy), each of which vary between zero and ten. Thus 
polity2 variable is defined on a [-10; 10] scale, with lower values indicating a less 
democratic and more autocratic political regime. The variable is then standardized to 
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
A4. Chinn-Ito financial openness index 
Chinn-Ito index measures openness of the capital account, i.e. the degree of capital 
mobility of a country. It was first introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006). The latest 
update of the data is available for 182 countries for the time period 1970-2013. Index 
is constructed on the base of 4 binary variables representing restrictions on the flow 
of capital. The variables indicate whether there are 
 multiple exchange rates (k1); 
 restrictions on current account transactions (k2); 
 restrictions on capital account transactions (k3); 
 requirements to surrender export proceeds (k4). 
k3 variable is calculated as the average of 5 consequent years that capital controls 
were absent. These variables can be further disaggregated. To measure capital 
account openness rather than capital controls, the variables are reversed so that they 
equal 1 if there are no capital controls. Then a single index of KAOPENt is 
constructed as the first standardized principal component of the 4 variables. By 
construction the index has zero mean value and we standardized it to have standard 
deviation of 1. 
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 Figure A1. Correlation between cyclical components of government 
expenditure and output by countries, 1996-2013. 
 
 
Note: Cyclical components are calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100). Procyclicality coefficient is the 
correlation coefficient between cyclical components of output and government expenditure. Negative correlation shows 
countercyclicality of government spending and positive correlation shows procyclicality. Government expenditure is 
proxied by general government total expenditure (constant national currency) and output is measured as annual GDP 
(constant national currency). The color of the bars gets lighter as the country moves from high income group to a lower 
one, thus: dark bars represent Western European countries, lighter ones are for Eastern European countries and the 
lightest bars show CIS countries. 
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Figure A2. Correlation between cyclical components of government expenditure 
and output in 1996-2004 vs. 2005-2013. 
 
Note: Cyclical components are calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ=100). Correlation between cyclical 
components of government expenditure and output is their correlation coefficient. Negative correlation shows 
countercyclicality of government spending and positive correlation shows procyclicality.  
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